Luther H. Thomas v. Glen Peterson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Luther H. Thomas v. Glen Peterson : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Everett E. Dahl; Attorney for appellant.
Gerald E. Nielson; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Luther H. Thomas v. Glen Peterson, No. 14034.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1164
IN T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T 
O F T H E S T A T E O F U T A H 




, Plaint iff-Respondent , ) 
• r } 
' v s . ) 
) 
GLEN PETERSON, ) 
) 




BRIGKJLV, YCli.'! J Ur.HirilTY 
J. Roaboa Ci:!: Lr.v School 
/^o^y 
Case No.^r-3-5-^7 
A P P E L L A N T ' S B R I E F 
A P P E A L FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE SEVENTH 
DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE EDWARD SHEYA, JUSTICE 
EVERETT E. DAHL 
760 Eas t Center Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
At torney for Appellant 
Glen Pe t e r son 
GERALD E . NIELSON 
840 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
At torney for Respondent, 





Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
R E L I E F SOUGHT ON A P P E A L . 








POINT I. PLAINTIFF 'S SALES CONTRACT IS VOID AND OF 
NO E F F E C T BECAUSE THE CONTRACT WAS 
ENTERED INTO WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY OF 
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF JOES VALLEY, 
INC 
POINT II. THE SALES CONTRACT WAS VOIDABLE AT THE 
OPTION OF THE CORPORATION BECAUSE THE 
PLAINTIFF AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, 
A DIRECTOR, AND GENERAL MANAGER OF 
JOES VALLEY MARINA, INC. , AND JOES VALLEY, 
I N C . , BREACHED HIS FIDUCIARY DUTY IN SUCH 
CONTRACT EXECUTION WITH THE CORPOR-
ATION 13 
POINT III. THE PROPERTY REFERRED TO IN THE PLAIN-
TIFF 'S SALES CONTRACT WAS ALREADY THE 
PROPERTY O F JOES VALLEY, INC. , AND AS 
SUCH THE PLAINTIFF HAD NOTHING TO CON-
VEY BY CONTRACT 16 
POINT IV. IF THE PROPERTY FORMERLY OF JOES VALLEY 
MARINA AND FORMERLY OF JOES VALLEY 
MARINA, INC . , WAS NOT TRANSFERRED TO 
JOES VALLEY, INC. , AS DE JURE CORPORATION, 
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ESTOPPED TO 
DENY THAT THE SAID PROPERTY WAS PRO-
PERLY VESTED IN JOES VALLEY, INC. , AS A 
DE FACTO CORPORATION 20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S - C o n t i n e d 
Page 
POINT V. ANY INTEREST CONVEYED BY THE PLAIN-
T I F F ' S SALES CONTRACT IS A SECURITY 
INTEREST AND SINCE THE PLAINTIFF 
NEVER P E R F E C T E D HIS SECURITY INTER-
EST, THE PLAINTIFF MAY NOT NOW ASSERT 
SUCH SECURITY INTEREST 25 
POINT VI. THE SALES CONTRACT WAS IMPROPERLY 
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE BY THE TRIAL 
COURT AND WAS, THEREFORE, REVERSIBLE 
ERROR 29 
CONCLUSION 30 
C A S E S C I T E D 
Allred v. Hinkley, 8 U. 2d 73, 328 P. 2d 726 (1958) . . . . 24 
Barker v. Glenwood, 82 U. 100, 21 P. 2d 889 (1933) . . . . 15 
Branch v. Western Factors, 28 U. 2d 361, 502 P. 2d 570 
(1972) . 13 
Chapman v. Troy Laundry Co., 87 U. 15, 47 P. 2d 1054 
(1935) 15 
Copper King Mining C o . , v. Hanson, 52 U. 605, 176 P . 623 
(1918) 10 
Cox v. B e r r y , 19 U. 2d 352, 431 P . 2d 575 (1967) 15 
Fos t e r v. Blake Heights C o r p . , U. 2d , 530 P . 2d 815 
(1974) 9 
Hansen v. Holding Co . , 117 U. 530, 218 P . 2d 274 (1950) . 13 
Hogan & Hall h Higgins, I n c . , v. Hall, 18 U. 2d 3, 414 
P . 2d 89 (1966) 15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S - C o n t i n u e d 
Page 
Jackson v. Bonneville I r r iga t ion Dist . , 66 U. 404, 
243, P . 107 (1926). . 10 
Lochwitz v. Pine Tree Min. & Mill C o . , 37 U. 349, 108 
P . 1128 (1910) 8 
Marsh v. Math ias , 19 U. 350, 56 P . 1074 (1899) 20,21 
Migliaccio v. Davis , 120 U. 1,232 P . 2d 195 (1951) . . . . 22 
Rocket Min. Corp v. Gill , 25 U. 2d 434, 483 P . 2d 897 
(1971) 15 
Sweeney v. Happy Valley, 18 U. 2d 113, 417 P . 2d 126 
(1966) 13 
Valley Bank & Trus t Co. , v. Gerber, U. 2d , 526 
P . 2d 1121 (1974) 24 
Vincent Drug C o . , v. Utah State Tax Comm. , 17 U. 2d 
202, 407 P . 2d 683 (1965) 21 
Westinghouse Credi t Corporat ion v. Hydroswift C o r p . , 
U. 2 d _ _ , 528 P . 2d 156 (1974) 9 
Wilson v. Westinghouse E lec t . C o r p . , 85 Wash. 2d 78, 
530 P . 2d 298 (1975) 22 
A U T H O R I T I E S C I T E D 
18 Am. Jur. 2d § 51 20 
19 Am. Jur. 2d I 1281 14 
29 Am. Jur. 2d p. 536 . . 10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S - Continued 
Page 
S T A T U T E S C I T E D 
§ 16-10-4 , Utah Code Annotated (1953) 11 
§ 16-10-6 (a) , Utah Code Annotated (1953) 5 ,6 
§ 16-10-33 , Utah Code Annotated (1953) 5 
§ 16-10-38, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 5 
§ 1 6 - 1 0 - 6 1 , Utah Code Annotated (1953) 17 
1 16-10-74, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 7 
§ 70A-1-201 (44), Utah Code Annotated (1953) 27 ,28 
§ 70 A-9 -102 , Utah Code Annotated (1953) 25 
§ 70A-9-105, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 28 
1 70A - 9 - 2 0 3 , Utah Code Annotated (1953) 25 
i 70A-9-301 (1), Utah Code Annotated (1953) . . . . . . . ' 2 6 
§ 70A-9-301 (1) (c), Utah Code Annotated (1953). . . . . . . 27 ,28 
§ 70 A-9-401 (1) (b), Utah Code Annotated (1953) •' 26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
) 
LUTHER H. THOMAS, ) 
) 
Pla int i f f -Respondent) 
) 
v s . ) CASE NO. 1 3 5 4 7 
) 
GLEN PETERSON, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
. . ) '.-
A P P E L L A N T ' S B R I E F 
S T A T E M E N T O F K I N D O F C A S E 
This is an act ion to de te rmine the r ights of the appellant 
Glen P e t e r s o n and Joes Valley, I n c . , to the possess ion of, or 
any in t e r e s t in, the p rope r ty that has fo rmer ly been assoc ia ted 
with Joes Valley, I n c . , and to quiet title to such p rope r ty . 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R C O U R T 
A judgment was en tered against the defendants, Joes 
Valley, I nc . , and Glen P e t e r s o n , which stated that the plaintiff, 
Luther H. Thomas was the owner and entitled to possess ion of 
p roper ty known as Joes Valley Marina including the specia l use 
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permi t of the United States Depar tment of Agr icu l tu re dated 
September 18, 1967, and that the defendants , Joes Valley, I nc . , 
Glen P e t e r s o n , and Omega Silver Corporat ion and al l who 
claimed ti t le under any of them to any such proper ty had no 
right, t i t le , i n t e re s t , c la im nor es ta te whatever in or upon 
such proper ty , and a l l defendants or pe rsons claiming through 
them were enjoined and deba r r ed from claiming any in te res t 
in such p roper ty . Defendan t s Motion for a New T r i a l was 
denied on January 31, 1975. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Defendant P e t e r s o n seeks an o r d e r d i smiss ing the plaintiff 's 
Complaint and quieting ti t le to proper ty r e f e r r e d to, or fo rmer ly 
a s soc ia t ed with Joes Valley Marina and the special use pe rmi t of 
the United States Depar tment of Agr icu l tu re , in defendant Joes 
Valley Mar ina , Inc. Defendant Pe t e r son further seeks an o rde r 
es tabl ishing the validi ty of h is lease to said proper ty under a 
l ease between defendant P e t e r s o n and defendant Joes Valley, 
Inc. 
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S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The facts of the case a r e par t ia l ly in d ispute . The plaintiff 
f o rmer ly owned al l of the a s s e t s of Joes Valley Marina and the 
special use pe rmi t of the United States Depar tment of Agr icu l tu re 
a s an individual (R. 6). The plaintiff then formed a corporat ion 
known by the name of Joes Valley Mar ine , I n c . , which possessed 
the fo rmer a s s e t s of Joes Valley Marina and the spec ia l use 
pe rmi t ( R. 11-17). New stockholders were taken into Joes 
Valley Mar ina , I n c . , here inaf ter r e f e r r ed to as Mar ina , I n c . , 
and the capital izat ion of Mar ina , I n c . , was i n c r e a s e d . 
The a r t i c l e s of incorporat ion of Mar ina , Inc. , we re then 
revised which changed the name of Joes Valley Mar ina , I nc . , 
to Joes Valley, I n c . , here inaf te r Joes Valley, I n c . , will be 
r e f e r r e d to a s Valley, I n c . , (R. 18-20). 
The defendant Joes Valley, I n c . , took possess ion of the 
r e f e r r e d to p roper ty and opera ted it until the Spring of 1973 at 
which t ime Valley, I n c . , purpor ted to sel l a l l of i ts a s s e t s to 
the defendant Omega Silver Corporation (R. 20-27) . The sale 
to Omega Silver Corporat ion has since d isc la imed any in te res t 
in the a g r e e m e n t or the p rope r ty of Valley, I n c . , (R. 3). 
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On or about July 4, 1973, the defendant Valley, I nc . , made 
and executed a wr i t ten lease with the option to buy the proper ty 
fo rmer ly known a s Joes Valley Marina and which included the 
specia l use pe rmi t , in favor of the defendant Glen P e t e r s o n . 
It should be noted that defendant Glen P e t e r s o n had previously 
negotiated with Valley, Inc. , on behalf of Omega Silver Corp-
orat ion, and the lease between Valley, Inc. , and defendant Glen 
P e t e r s o n was en te red into after Omega Silver Corporat ion lost 
i n t e re s t in the proper ty acquis i t ion (R. 147). 
The dispute in the facts a r i s e s between the plaintiff and 
defendant Glen P e t e r s o n because the plaintiff contends that the 
p roper ty in Mar ina , Inc. , was t r a n s f e r r e d by a sa les ag reemen t 
(Ex. 2) dated Apr i l 19, 1972, to Valley, I n c . , (R. 10). The 
defendant contends that said proper ty was t r a n s f e r r e d from 
Marina, Inc. , to Valley, Inc. , by the r ev i sed a r t i c l e s of incorp-
orat ion and not by the sa les a g r e e m e n t (Ex .2) . 
This sa les a g r e e m e n t (Ex. 2) between the plaintiff and 
defendant Joes Valley, I n c . , was in default, and the re fo re , the 
plaintiff sought to r e c l a i m the p roper ty in accordance with said 
sa les a g r e e m e n t (Ex. 2). There fore , the plaintiff contends that the 
defendant Glen P e t e r s o n has no leasehold es ta te since Valley, I n c . , 
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does not have any p roper ty to l e a s e . The defendant Glen Pe t e r son , 
on the other hand, c la ims that the sa les ag reemen t (Ex. 2) is 
inoperat ive a s is set forth in defendant Glen P e t e r s o n ' s Argument 
on appea l . 
AR G U M E N T 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF 'S SALES CONTRACT IS VOID AND OF NO 
E F F E C T BECAUSE THE CONTRACT WAS ENTERED 
INTO WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS OF JOES VALLEY, INC. 
According the the Bus iness Corporat ion Act, § 16-10-33, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953), "The bus iness affairs of a corporat ion 
shall be managed by the board of d i r e c t o r s . , r And according to 
§ 1 6 - 1 0 - 3 8 , Utah Code Annotated (1953): 
A major i ty of the number of d i r e c t o r s fixed by the 
bylaws, .
 # . shall consti tute a quorum for the t r a n s -
action of bus iness unless a g r e a t e r number is r equ i red . 
by the a r t i c l e s of incorporat ion or the bylaws. The act 
of a major i ty of the d i r e c t o r s p resen t at a meet ing at 
which a quorum is p resen t shal l be the ac t of the board 
of d i r e c t o r s , un less the act of a g r e a t e r number is 
r equ i red by the a r t i c l e s of incorporat ion or the bylaws. 
And the defense of Ultra Vi res , § 16-10-6 (a), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) gives the author i ty to set as ide unauthorized a c t s and s ta tes 
that: 
If the unauthorized a c t s or t r ans fe r sought to be enjoined 
a r e being, or a r e to be performed or made pursuant to 
any cont rac t to which the corporat ion is a par ty , the court 
may , if a l l of the pa r t i e s to the contract a r e pa r t i e s to the 
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proceeding and if it deems the same to be equit-
ab le , se t a s ide and enjoin the per formance of such 
cont rac t . . . 
The plaintiff s ta ted that he was in te res ted in selling the Joes 
Valley Mar ina , but that one J . R . Taylor persuaded h im to turn 
the p roper ty into a corpora t ion (R.7) . The corporat ion was called 
Joes Valley Mar ina , I n c . , here inaf te r r e f e r r e d to a s Mar ina , I n c . , 
(R.9) . It then a p p e a r s that it is the plaintiff 's contention that the 
proper ty of Mar ina , I n c . , was to be t r a n s f e r r e d to Joes Valley, 
I n c . , here inaf te r Valley, Inc . , by a sa les ag r eemen t (Ex.2) . 
The plaintiff s tated that the cont rac t was purpor tedly executed at 
a board of di rector ' s meet ing (R. 10). The sa les ag reemen t shows 
Luther H. Thomas a s se l le r and Joes Valley, Inc. , by Julian R. 
Taylor a s p u r c h a s e r , but does not indicate in what capacity 
Mr . Taylor is serving (R.13). 
The re is no quest ion that Mr . Taylor and Mr . Thomas 
signed the contract , but r a the r the question revolves around 
whether Mr . Taylor , under author i ty from the board of d i r e c t o r s , 
executed the cont rac t on behalf of Joes Valley, Inc. 
It has long been recognized in the State of Utah that an 
officer or d i r ec to r of a corpora t ion may only act with the e x p r e s s 
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or implied author i ty conveyed upon him or her by the board 
of d i r e c t o r s . Of course , day to day act iv i t ies may be ca r r i ed 
on by the officers of the corporat ion, but with the purchase or 
sale of what a p p e a r s to be the en t i re a s s e t s of Mar ina , I n c . , 
and Valley, Inc. , r e spec t ive ly , .the board of d i r e c t o r s mus t 
ac t d i r ec t ly . 
Additionally, it should be r e m e m b e r e d that while the 
plaintiff was a s tockholder , the capital ization was inc reased 
and new s tockholders has been taken into Mar ina , I n c . , at the 
t ime of the purported sa les t ransac t ion (Ex.2) . 
With r e g a r d to the alleged sa les t r ans fe r (Ex.2) from Mar ina , 
I n c . , it should be pointed out that § 16-10-74, Utah Code Annotated, 
(1953) s ta tes that: 
A s a l e . . .or other disposi t ion of al l , or substant ia l ly 
a l l , the p roper ty and a s s e t s , with or without the good 
will , of a corpora t ion , if not made in the usual and r e g -
ular course of its bus iness , may be made . . . in the 
following manne r : (a) The board of d i r e c t o r s shal l 
adopt a resolu t ion recommending such sa le , . . . and 
d i rec t ing the submiss ion thereof to a vote a t a meet ing 
of sha reho lde r s . . . " 
The r e s t of section 16-10-74 then goes on to specifywhat the 
p rocedure should be with r e g a r d to the sha reho lde r s mee t ing . Since 
it a p p e a r s that the sha reho lde r s a r e the same p e r s o n s a s the officers 
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and d i r e c t o r s , the r e a l quest ion comes down to whether or not 
a resolu t ion was passed by the d i r e c t o r s , and whether in fact 
any act ion, e i ther o ra l ly or wri t ten , or formal ly or informally 
was ever taken by such board of d i r e c t o r s . This is important 
with not only the sa les of a l l of the a s s e t s of Mar ina , Inc. , but 
a l so with r e g a r d to Valley, Inc. , who cannot be bound to any 
such contrac t un less it has been taken pursuant to the author i ty 
ves ted in the board of d i r e c t o r s . 
It was stated in Lochwitz v. Pine Tree Min. & Mill Co. , 
37 U. 349, 108 P. 1128 (1910) that: 
The board of d i r e c t o r s to whom the author i ty to bind the 
corpora t ion is commit ted is not the individual d i r e c t o r s 
s ca t t e r ed he re and the re , whose a s s e n t to a given act 
may be col lected by a dil igent c anvas se r , but it is the 
. b o a r d itting and consulting together in a body. Indiv-
idual d i r e c t o r s , or any number of them le s s than a 
quorum, have no author i ty as d i r e c t o r s to bind the 
corpora t ion . And this is equally the ru le , although 
the d i r ec to r who a s s u m e s to do so may own a m a j -
o r i ty of the s h a r e s . . . under our statute the powers 
_ of the co rpora t i n mus t be exe rc i sed by a quorum of 
the board of d i r e c t o r s when a s sembled as a body. 
The pres ident , the re fore , could not make a binding 
cont rac t . . . un less author ized to do so by such a 
quorum. 
The Court in Lochwitz goes on to point out that if such were not the 
ru le , con t rac t s could eas i ly be entered into to the ruin of the c o r p -
ora t ion and the s tockho lders . 
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It should be pointed out that our situation is not the same 
a s presented in Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Hydroswift Corp. 
U. 2d _ , 528 P . 2d 156 (1974) where the Court stated that: 
It is not to be doubted that enter ing into such a 
contrac t by a corporat ion not only usual ly i s , but 
should be done, by authorizat ion of i ts board of 
d i r e c t o r s . . . . t h i s is subject to exceptions 
according to the r equ i r emen t s of jus t ice and 
equity in individual c a s e s . There is a l so a well 
recognized rule that a corporat ion may not r e -
p resen t to another par ty that it has executed a 
valid cont rac t , induce the other to per form, 
accept the benefi ts , and then when it sui ts it s 
i n t e re s t , r e n e g e . . . 
Our si tuation cer ta in ly does not fall into this ca tegory . Valley, I n c . , 
cer ta in ly has not induced the plaintiff into any contact . The plaintiff 
was a l r eady into the bus iness of which he wished to escape and his 
attempting to contrac t with Valley, I nc . , was the means by which the 
plaintiff a t tempted to get out of such bus ines s . There fo re , the gen-
e ra l rule mus t be followed which r e q u i r e s the board of d i r e c t o r s to 
au thor ize such a sa les cont rac t . 
It is fur ther emphas ized that action must be taken by the 
board of d i r e c t o r s with r e g a r d to such a m a t t e r where the Court in 
Fos t e r v. Blake Heights Corporat ion, U. 2d , 530 P . 2d 815 
(1974) noted that nsfj o officer or agent of a corpora t ion has author i ty 
to make a cont rac t to se l l i ts r ea l es ta te withoutlaction thereon by 
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the board of d i r e c t o r s H . " Again s imi la r s t a tements a r e made 
by the Court in Jackson v. Bonneville I r r . Dist . , 66 U. 404, 243 
P . 107 (1926). 
The Dis t r ic t Judge s ta tes in his Memorandum Decision in the 
p resen t act ion that n the evidence indicates that the books and r e c o r d s 
of the corpora t ion we re so c a r e l e s s l y and imperfec t ly kept a s not to 
show the ac t s of the corpora t ion , and it has been held that in such 
event such ac t s and reso lu t ions may be proved by parol , in the 
absence of a s tatute to the con t r a ry . (See 29 Am. J u r . 2d p. 536). n 
The defendant has no d i s a g r e e m e n t with th is s ta tement and in fact 
quotes Copper King Mining Co. , v. Hanson, 52 U. 605, 176 P . 623 
(1918) where in the Court s ta tes that, "Any act of the d i r e c t o r s may 
be proven by o ra l tes t imony, when it is shownthat no r e c o r d was 
made of such act ion, or when it is shown that if such r e c o r d was 
made it has been l o s t . " 
However, it should be noted that minutes and board reso lu t ions 
were made and r e c o r d e d for other ac t ions taken by the board of 
d i r e c t o r s . Such minu tes and reso lu t ions included a reso lu t ion 
record ing the change in corpora te name and a reso lu t ion was r eco rded 
in the board meet ing record ing the defendant P e t e r s o n ' s l e a s e . In 
fact, it a p p e a r s that the only resolut ion that was not r eco rded was 
the reso lu t ion with r e g a r d to the plaintiff 's sa les cont rac t (Ex. 2). 
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The plaintiff does not claim that any r e c o r d s were lost , 
but it cer ta in ly m u s t appear axiomat ic , that the plaintiff has 
the burden of showing that the d i r e c t o r s took such act ion or 
made any such reso lu t ion . 
There fore , let us look at the r eco rd to de t e rmine if the 
plaintiff ever made such a showing. The plaintiff s tated that he 
could not r e m e m b e r a l l the deta i l s that went on a t the meet ing at 
which the corpora te action was to have been taken with r e g a r d 
to the sa les cont rac t (R. 11), and that he read the contract while 
the meet ing was being c a r r i e d on. The plaintiff s ta ted that he knew 
of no minutes of any meet ing which would per ta in to the sa les 
cont rac t (R. 13). The plaintiff s tated that he did not know if the 
sa les contract (Ex. 2) showed any designation of any officer of 
the Valley, I n c . , (R. 13), and said contract does not infact contain 
any such notation (Ex, 2). It should a l so be noted that while § 1 6 -
1 0 - 4 , Utah Code Annotated (1953) author ized a corporat ion to have 
a sea l , that no such seal was placed on the sa les cont rac t (Ex .2) . 
Also , it does not appear that the s e c r e t a r y of the corporat ion signed 
the document (Ex. 2). 
The Court in fact sustained the defendant 's objection that the 
plaintiff had not sufficiently laid a foundation to int roduce the sa les 
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contract at that t ime (R. 14)0 A s imi l a r objection was sustained 
a s to the bylaws of the corpora t ion , Valley, Inc. , and the Court 
suggested that the s e c r e t a r y of the corporat ion, Mr. Carnaval i , 
be quest ioned to see if these documents could be introduced by 
him, (R.17) . 
When Mr . Carnaval i was quest ioned with r e g a r d to the sa les 
a g r e e m e n t (Ex. 2), he s ta ted that he had a gene ra l unders tanding 
of the sa l e s a g r e e m e n t (R.75), but that he had never seen the 
a g r e e m e n t nor did he have a copy of it (R. 97). Again, the Court 
did not let the sa les a g r e e m e n t be introduced into evidence 
(R. 77-79) . 
Finally the lower court s tated with r e fe rence to the a d m i s -
sibil i ty of the sa les contract (Ex.2) , " I think I a m going to admi t 
the a g r e e m e n t a s i l lus t ra t ive of his tes t imony only without any 
quest ion about the legal i ty of it . . . . But that does not es tab l i sh 
now the validity of the a g r e e m e n t . That r e m a i n s o p e n . n (R. 156). 
In fact, the plaintiff never at any t ime proved that the sa les a g r e e -
ment (Ex. 2) was ever passed upon by a major i ty of the board of 
d i r e c t o r s , and in fact, the t r i a l court never at any t ime admit ted 
the sa l e s cont rac t into evidence for any purpose other than to be 
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i l lus t ra t ive of the plaintiff 's tes t imony. Therefore , there 
was never shown to be any action by the board of d i r e c t o r s 
to author ize the sa les cont rac t . 
POINT II. 
THE SALES CONTRACT WAS VOIDABLE AT THE 
OPTION OF THE CORPORATION BECAUSE THE 
PLAINTIFF AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, 
A DIRECTOR, AND GENERAL MANAGER OF JOES 
VALLEY MARINA, INC. , AND JOES VALLEY, INC . , 
BREACHED HIS FIDUCIARY DUTY IN SUCH CON-
TRACT EXECUTION WITH THE CORPORATIONS. 
The Court s tated in Branch v. Wes te rn F a c t o r s , 28 U. 2d 361, 
502 P . 2d 570 (1972) that "A d i r ec to r occupies a f iduciary re la t ionsh ip 
to his corpora t ion , and his persona l deal ings with the corporat ion 
may be avoided unless good faith and fa i rness a r e shown. '1 In 
Sweeney v. Happy Valley, 18 U. 2d 113, 417 P . 2d 126 (1966) the 
Court said, M . . . when a fiduciary deals for his own in t e re s t with 
the benefic iary, in case any question a r i s e s , such dealings should 
be scrut in ized with c a r e , and the burden is upon him to show good 
faith in the t r a n s a c t i o n . " Similar language is used in Hansen v. 
Holding Co . , 117 U. 530, 218 P . 2d 274 (1950), whe re the Court 
s tated that fl . . . cour t s of equity will carefully sc ru t in ize the 
deal ings of the mangement and set as ide such t r ansac t ions on 
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slight g rounds . " 
Good faith and fa i rness obviously requ i re a full and com-
plete d i s c lo su re to an independent and d i s in t e re s t ed board of 
d i r e c t o r s . It follows that a full and complete d i sc losu re would 
requ i re the plaintiff to s ta te such i t ems as the cont rac t p r i ce , 
the plaintiff 's profit in the m a t t e r , possible alternatives open 
to the corpora t ion , and the value of the p roper ty . Yet in the 
.present si tuation, not only w e r e these things not done, but in 
fact, t he re was never any d i scuss ion a s to the m a t t e r and it 
a p p e a r s that the only person that has been shown to be privy 
to the negotiat ion was M r . J . R . Taylor , the apparen t pres ident 
of Mar ina , Inc., and la te r Valley, Inc. 
As is s tated in 19 A m . Jur .2d § 1281: 
P e r s o n a l deal ings with the corporat ion or t r ansac t ions 
with the corpora t ion in which the d i r ec to r has some 
pe r sona l i n t e r e s t may be avoided unless good faith 
and fa i rness a r e shown. While occupying such a fid-
uc i a ry re la t ion , the officers and d i r e c t o r s of a c o r p -
ora t ion a r e precluded from receiving any persona l 
advantage without the fullest d i s c lo su re , and a s s e n t 
of, a l l concerned . 
Again, it does not appear that the r e q u i r e m e n t s s tated in 19 Am. 
Jur .2d § 1281 have even attenapted to be complied with since not 
only was the re not full d i s c lo su re , but there was in fact, no d i s c lo su re 
wha t soeve r . 
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The Court noted in Hogan & Hall & Higgins, L i e , v. Hall, 
18 U. 2d 3, 414 P 2d 89 (1966) that it was " . . . cognizant of 
the fact that there a r e thousands of d i r e c t o r s who a r e unaware 
of the respons ib i l i t i es of their posi t ions, and do not r ea l i ze that 
their pe r sona l i n t e r e s t s a r e subordinated to that of thei r co rp-
orat ion in case of conf l ic t ." It cannot se r ious ly be contended 
that the plaintiff was concerned about the in te res t of the co rpor -
at ion. 
The plaintiff in fact stated that he wanted to get out of the 
bus iness for health r e a s o n s (R. 6), and it cer ta in ly does not 
appear that the plaintiff r ea l i zed that his i n t e re s t s were sub-
ordinated to that of his corpora t ion . 
There a r e many cases that a s s e r t what the duty of a f iduciary 
is to his corporat ion, Cox v. B e r r y , 19 U 2d 352, 431 P . 2d 575 
(1967): Rocket Min. Corp . v. Gill, 25 U. 2d 434, 483 P . 2d 897 
(1971): Ba rke r v. Glenwood, 82 U. 100, 21 P . 2d 889 (1933), but 
suffice it to say as quoted from Chapman v. Troy Laundry Co. , 
87 U. 15, 47 P . 2d 1054 (1935), if d i r e c t o r s » . . . se l l or dispose 
of corpora te p roper ty with a view to gain persona l advantage r a t h e r 
than for the purpose of enhancing the in t e re s t s of the corporat ion, 
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they a r e guilty of bad faith. M 
There fo re , s ince the plaintiff did not deal with the corpora t ion 
in good faith and f a i r n e s s , the contrac t is voidable at the option of 
the corpora t ion . And since the corpora t ion has sought to set the 
contract a s ide , the Court should allow such action on the corpor-
ation' s behalf. 
POINT I I I . 
THE PROPERTY REFERRED TO IN THE PLAINTIFF 'S 
SALES CONTRACT WAS ALREADY THE PROPERTY OF 
JOES VALLEY, INC., AND AS SUCH, THE PLAINTIFF 
HAD NOTHING TO CONVEY BY CONTRACT. 
The t r i a l court s tated in i ts Memorandum Opinion that the 
defendant P e t e r s o n can only a s s e r t his c la im of r ight by r ea son of 
the plaintiff 's sa les contrac t (Ex.2) and not o therwise , and there fore , 
if the plaintiff sa les cont rac t is invalid, the defendant P e t e r s o n will 
have no r igh ts t he reunde r . However, the defendant P e t e r s o n does 
not c la im to a s s e r t h is leasehold es ta te through the sa les cont rac t 
(Ex. 2) ,but r a the r s t a tes that the proper ty sought to be conveyed by 
the plaintiff to Valley, I n c . , was a l r eady the proper ty of Valley, Inc. 
There fo re , even if the sa les cont rac t (Ex.2) is o therwise valid, 
the plaintiff had nothing to convey to Valley, Inc. , s ince said p roper ty 
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was a l r eady in Valley, Inc. And if the sa les contract (Ex.2) 
is found to be invalid, the invalidity of said contract doesn ' t 
affect the l e a s s e e ' s r ights because the l e s see does not claim to take 
p roper ty by r eason of the sa les contract , but r a the r the l e s s e e ' s 
r igh ts a r e independent of the sa les contract since the proper ty was 
a l r eady t r a n s f e r r e d to Valley, Inc. 
It is ax iomat ic that a person cannot convey proper ty which he 
does not own or which has o therwise been put beyond his personal 
control . The t r i a l court stated in its Memorandum of Opinion that 
the plaintiff was 100% stockholder in Joes Valley Mar ina , I n c . , 
(R. 48) i . e . , Marina, Inc. , and the re does not appear to be any con-
tention by the plaintiff to the con t ra ry . However, it appea r s to be 
the plaintiff 's position that the p roper ty t r a n s f e r r e d by Marina , i n c . 
to Valley, I n c . , was by cont rac t . Thedefendent P e t e r s o n ' s posi t ion 
is that the p rope r ty was t r ans f e r r ed by a revis ion to the a r t i c l e s of 
incorpora t ion . 
§ 16-10-61 Utah Code Annotated (1953) gives a corporat ion the 
power to change its name by amending its ar t ic les of incorporat ion. 
If such prodecure is c a r r i ed out, obviously the only change in the 
s t ruc tu re would be the name or any other m a t t e r r e f e r r e d to in the 
r e s t a t ed a r t i c l e s of incorpora t ion . 
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The tax r e t u r n s for the y e a r s of 1971 and 1972 of Joes 
Valley Marina , Inc. , showed deprec ia t ion of the a s s e t s which 
had been the proper ty of Joes Valley Marina before incorporat ion, 
and as such this suppor ts the position that the a s s e t s had been 
t r ea ted by the plaintiff as though they were the proper ty of Marina, 
Inc. (R. 54), The plaintiff test if ied that a l l the proper ty under 
Marina , I n c . , was his en t i re ly (R.47) . 
The plaintiff then testified that he amended the a r t i c l e s of 
incorporat ion of Mar ina , I n c . , to i n c r e a s e the capital izat ion 
(R.49) . The plaintiff then stated that he once again amended the 
a r t i c l e s of incorpora t ion to change the name from Joes Valley 
Marina I n c . , to Joes Valley, I n c . , and that he opera ted the mar ina 
personal ly , except in the winter t ime , up and unti l 1972 (R. 49-50) . 
The re fo re , by the plaintiff 's own tes t imony, the amended a r t i c l e s 
of incorporat ion m e r e l y changed the name from Joes Valley Marina , 
I n c . , to Joes Valley, Inc. , and as such the proper ty became Joes 
Valley, Inc. , by such amendment . 
Addit ionally, the plaintiff sought to t r ans fe r his use pe rmi t a s 
a gene ra l manager to Joes Valley, I n c . , (R. 56-57) pr ior to the sa les 
cont rac t (Ex.2) (R. 142). And it a p p e a r s that one of the r e a s o n s that 
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the sa les ag r eemen t came about was because of some difficulty 
in having the Fo re s t Service t ransfer the use pe rmi t from Marina, 
I n c . , to Valley, I n c . , because of an outstanding obligation owed to 
a third par ty , Mr . Falsone (R.57) . The plaintiff a l so testified 
that he withdrew his use pe rmi t from the U . S . F o r e s t se rv ice 
and obtained a specia l use permi t for Joes Valley, I n c . , while 
acting a s a genera l manager for Joes Valley, Inc . , (R . 58). 
Finally, the plaintiff admi ts that Marina , I n c . , and Valley, 
Inc. , a r e one and the same entity other than the name (R. 64-65). 
The plaintiff, however , denies that he ever t r a n s f e r r e d any proper ty 
to Mar ina , I n c . , (R. 65), but this appea r s inconsis tent with his act ions 
with r e g a r d to income tax and the ruling by the t r i a l cour t . That i s , 
it appea r s that Marina , Inc. , t rea ted the p roper ty a s i ts own (R. 54) 
and it does not appear that the plaintiff t rea ted the p roper ty a s his 
in his individual tax r e t u r n s for 1971 and 1972# 
Therefore , since the proper ty had a l r eady vested in Valley, Inc. , 
p r io r to the sa les cont rac t (Ex.2) , the plaintiff had nothing to convey. 
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POINT IV. 
I F THE PROPERTY FORMERLY OF JOES 
VALLEY MARINA, AND FORMERLY OF 
JOES VALLEY MARINA, INC. , WAS NOT 
TRANSFERRED TO JOES VALLEY, INC. , 
SO AS TO QUALIFY JOES VALLEY, INC. , 
AS DE JURE CORPORATION, THE PLAINTIFF 
SHOULD BE ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT THE 
SAID PROPERTY WAS PROPERLY VESTED IN 
JOES VALLEY, INC. , AS A DE FACTO CORPOR-
ATION. 
18 Am, J u r . 2d i 51 , s t a tes that: 
It is o rd ina r i ly e s sen t i a l to the exis tence of a de facto 
corpora t ion that the re be (1) valid law under which a 
corpora t ion with the powers a s s u m e d might be incor -
porated; (2) a bona fide a t tempt to organize a c o r p o r -
at ion under such law; and (3) an ac tua l exe rc i s e of 
co rpora te p o w e r s . 
In consider ing these e l emen t s , it a p p e a r s that the Utah s tatutes allow 
a corpora t ion such a s Valley, I n c . , and it a l so a p p e a r s that the re 
was a bona fide a t t empt to organize Valley, Inc. , if it was in fact 
not o rgan ized . Additionally, it a l so a p p e a r s that the corporat ion 
actual ly exe rc i s ed its corpora te powers when it executed a valid 
l ease in favor of the defendant P e t e r s o n (R. 148-149) . 
De facto corpora t ions have long been recognized in the State 
of Utah. In the case of Mar sh v. Mathias , 19 U. 350, 56 P . 1074 
(1899), the Court said: 
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Wherether there a r e such defects in the o r -
ganizat ion as would render it vulnerable to 
an a t tack by the s tate itself is a question not 
n e c e s s a r y for use to decide in this case . . . 
Moreover , where , a s in the case at ba r , there 
has been such a bona fide a t tempt to c rea te a 
corpora t ion , and in like good faith such an 
assumpt ion and exe rc i s e of corpora te function, 
a s to consti tute a corporat ion de facto, the legal 
exis tence of the corpora t ion cannot, a s a gene ra l 
ru le be inquired into col la tera l ly , even though 
there be an absence of compliance with some of 
the legal fo rmal i t i e s . . . the complainants a r e 
s tockholders , and have dealt with the corpora t ion 
since its organiza t ion , and have recognized its 
powers and acquiesced in the exe rc i se thereof 
for a l a rge number of y e a r s , they a r e estopped 
from questioning in such a proceeding a s this 
the rightful exis tence of the corporat ion . . . a 
s tockholder who has par t ic ipated in its ac t s as 
a corporat ion de facto is estopped to deny its 
rightful ex i s t ence . 
The case of Vincent Drug C o . , v. Utah State Tax Comm., 17 U. 2d 
202,407 P . 2d 683 (1965) rea f f i rms this posit ion. This appea r s to 
be in line with our p resen t s i tuat ion. The plaintiff has allowed the 
corporat ion to c a r r y on i ts exis tence as though it has owned a l l the 
r e f e r r e d to p roper ty , if in fact the corporat ion did not,and as such 
should be estopped from claiming to innocent third pa r t i e s that he 
owns the p roper ty individually and that the corporat ion in fact 
owns nothing. 
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Additionally, equitable estoppel i tself should preclude 
the plaintiff f rom a s s e r t i n g that Valley, Inc . , did not have any 
proper ty to convey. The case of Wilson v. Westinghouse ElecP 
C o r p . , 85 Wash 2d 78, 530 P . 2d 298 (1975) s ta tes that equitable 
estoppel may a r i s e when a person commi t s : 
(1) an admiss ion , s ta tement , or ac t inconsis tent 
with the c la im a f te rwards a s s e r t e d ; (2) action by 
the other par ty on the faith of such admiss ion , 
s t a tement or act ; (3) injury to such other party 
resu l t ing from permit t ing the f i r s t par ty to con t ra -
dict or repudia te such admiss ion , s ta tement or ac t . 
This a p p e a r s to be the position taken by the Utah Court in Migliaccio 
v. Davis 120 U. 1, 232 P . 2d 195 (1951) where in the Court s ta ted: 
Equitable es toppel . . . is the principle by which a par ty 
who knows or should know the t ru th is absolutely p r e -
cluded, both a t law and in equity, f rom denying or a s s e r t -
ing the con t r a ry of, any m a t e r i a l fact, which, by his 
words or conduct, aff i rmative or negative, intention- . 
al ly or thourgh culpable negl igence, he has induced 
another , who was excusably ignorant of the t rue facts 
and who had a r ight to re ly upon such words and con-
duct, to bel ieve and ac t upon them thereby, as a 
consequence reasonably to be ant ic ipated, changing 
his position in such a way that he would suffer injury 
if such denial or con t ra ry a s s e r t i o n were al lowed. 
There fo re , the theory of equitable estoppel should be applied aga ins t 
the plaintiff because : F i r s t , the plaintiff had m a t e r i a l l y mi s l ead the 
defendant P e t e r s o n into believing that the Valley, Inc. , was the owner 
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of the p roper ty fo rmer ly r e f e r r ed to as Joes Valley Marina , 
or Joes Valley Mar ina , Inc. The ma te r i a l l y mis leading act 
took place because the defendant P e t e r s o n had previous ly ne -
gotiated with the plaintiff on behalf of Omega Si lver , and that 
while the plaintiff may have indicated that Valley, I n c . , owed 
him money, the plaintiff did not indicate to the defendant Pe t e r son 
that Valley, Inc. , was not the t rue owner of the above r e f e r r ed 
to p rope r ty (R. 20-27) . It should be pointed out that the plaintiff 
c la imed to have shown defendant pe te r son a sa les ag reemen t with 
Valley, I n c . , (R. 22), but the plaintiff never proved his al legat ion 
and the defendant P e t e r s o n c la ims to the con t ra ry (R. 124);. 
Second, the defendant Pe t e r son entered into a lease with Valley, 
I n c . , because of the m a t e r i a l m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n r e f e r r e d to, 
and obviously because the defendant Ffeterson believed that Valley, 
Inc. , was the owner of said p roper ty (R. 147); Third, the defendant 
P e t e r s o n will be adve r se ly affected and m a t e r i a l l y injured if the 
plaintiff is allowed to contradict his previous posit ion that Valley, 
I n c . , was the owner of said proper ty , and now state that Valley, 
I n c . , is not the owner and addit ionally, it would be ex t r eme ly in-
equitable to allow the plaintiff to a s s e r t such an inconsis tent 
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position to the de t r imen t of the defendant P e t e r s o n . 
Also , it should be noted that the plaintiff was the one who 
allowed himsel f to be convinced by Mr . Taylor of the p ropr ie ty 
of the or ig ina l incorporat ion (R.7) , and it has been noted on 
s e v e r a l occass ions by the Court that where one of two innocent • 
pa r t i e s mus t suffer, the loss should fall on the one who c rea ted 
the c i r c u m s t a n c e s which made it possible for the wrong to be 
pe rpe t r a t ed . Al l red v. Hinkley, 8 U. 2d 73, 328 P . 2d 726 (1958); 
Valley Bank & T r u s t Co. v. Ge rbe r , U. 2d , 526 P . 2d 
1121 (1974). 
There fo re , the plaintiff should be estopped from a s s e r t i n g that 
Valley, Inc. , did not have the power to convey proper ty to the 
defendant P e t e r s o n and this is by r ea son that if Valley, I n c . , did 
not in fact have the ac tua l power to so convey the p roper ty , the 
plaintiff s t i l l may not so a s s e r t under the theo r i e s of equitable estoppe 
and de facto corpora t ion . 
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POINT V 
ANY INTEREST CONVEYED BY THE PLAINTIFF 'S 
SALES CONTRACT IS A SECURITY INTEREST AND 
SINCE THE PLAINTIFF NEVER P E R F E C T E D HIS 
SECURITY INTEREST, THE PLAINTIFF MAY NOT 
. NOW ASSERT SUCH SECURITY INTEREST. 
§ 70A-9-102, Utah Code Annotated (1953) s t a t e s : 
(1) . . . this chapter appl ies so far as concerns any 
persona l p roper ty and fixtures within the j u r i s -
••' diction of this state (a) to any t ransac t ion ( r ega rd -
l e s s of i ts form) which is intended to c rea te a 
secur i ty in t e res t in persona l proper ty or f ixtures 
including goods, documents , i n s t rumen t s , gene ra l 
intangibles , chattle paper , accounts or contract 
r i gh t s ; . . . (2) This chapter appl ies to secur i ty 
i n t e r e s t c rea ted by contract including pledge, 
a s s ignment , chattel mor tgage . . . or ti t le r e -
tention contract and lease or consignment 
intended a s s ecu r i t y . 
The p roper ty r e f e r r e d to in the sa les contract (Ex.2) is a use pe r -
mit to the p rope r ty of the L'nited States Department of Agr icu l tu re , 
and f ixtures a t tached to said p roper ty . Additionally, the sa les 
contract (Ex.2) is a title re ta ining cont rac t . There fo re , the t r a n s -
action comes under the Uniform Commerc ia l Code, Secured T r a n s -
act ion Ti t le . 
£ 70A-9-203, Utah Code Annotated (1953) s t a tes that: 
. . . a secur i ty in t e re s t is not enforceable aga ins t 
the debtor or third pa r t i e s unless . . . (b) the debtor 
has signed a secur i ty ag reement which contains a 
descr ip t ion of the col la teral . . . 
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The plaintiff admit ted in his memorandum in support of 
s u m m a r y judgment that the plaintiff has not filed a financing 
s ta tement with the S e c r e t a r y of State of Utah. A tit le re taining 
ag reemen t mus t be filed in the S e c r e t a r y of Sta te ' s office in 
o rde r to be perfected, § 70A-9-401 (1) (b), and it can be seen, 
the re fo re , that the plaintiff 's secur i ty i n t e re s t is not perfected. 
Addit ionally, § 70A-9-301 (1), Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
s ta tes that: 
Except a s o therwise provided in subsect ion (2), an 
unperfected secur i ty i n t e re s t is subordinate to the 
r igh ts of . . . (c) in the case of good, i n s t rumen t s , 
documents , and chat tel paper , a person who is not 
a secured par ty and who is a t r a n s f e r r e e in bulk or 
o ther buyer not in o rd ina ry course of bus iness to 
the extent that he gives value and r ece ive s de l ivery 
of the co l l a t e ra l without knowledge of the secur i ty 
i n t e r e s t and before it is perfected. 
In the plaintiff 's motion for s u m m a r y judgment, he contends that the 
defendant P e t e r s o n did not (1) rece ive physical possess ion of the 
co l la te ra l , (2) the defendant P e t e r s o n did not r ece ive de l ivery of 
the co l l a t e ra l without knowledge of the plaintiff 's secur i ty in te res t , 
and (3) the defendant P e t e r s o n did not give va lue . The t r i a l cour t 
in its m e m o r a n d u m opinion (p. 2-3) s tated that the defendant 
P e t e r s o n had knowledge of the plaintiff 's i n t e re s t in said proper ty , 
that the defendant never had possess ion of the proper ty , that the 
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defendant failed to obtain the wri t ten approval o f the U . S . De-
par tment of Agr icu l tu re , as requi red by the defendant 's l ease , 
nor did the defendant per form other t e r m s of the l e a s e . 
It should be pointed out that the plaintiff was precluded from 
taking physical possess ion of the proper ty . The defendant failed 
to obtain wr i t ten approval of the U .S . Department of Agr icu l tu re 
and failed to pe r fo rm any other t e r m s of the lease by reason 
of the action of the plaintiff, third pa r t i e s , or Valley, I n c . , and 
there fore , such conditions may not preclude the plaintiff from 
enforcing his l e a s e . It should be pointed out that with re fe rence 
to these that no evidence was put into the r e c o r d about such m a t t e r s 
and the plaintiff never proved such to be the case . 
Therefore , a considerat ion of § 70A-9-301 (1) (c) appears, 
to be in o r d e r . F i r s t of a l l , while the defendant admi ts that he 
knew that Valley, Inc. , may have owed the plaintiff some money, 
the defendant Pe t e r son did not know that the plaintiff had a secur i ty 
in t e res t in the p roper ty of Valley, Inc . , (R. 124). Knowledge, a s 
r e f e r r e d to in this sect ion, means actual knowledge. Secondly, the 
defendant was precluded by ac t s of the plaintiff from performing 
the conditions of the l e a s e . Additionally, § 70A-1-201 (44), Utah 
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Code Annotated (1953) defines value when it s ta tes that: 
. . . a person gives "value11 for r ights if he acqu i r e s 
them. . . (d) genera l ly , in r e tu rn for any considerat ion 
sufficient to support a s imple con t rac t . 
Finally, a s indicated the defendant did not rece ive physical pos-
sess ion of the ac tua l p roper ty by ac t s of the plaintiff. This point 
a s ide , § 70-A-9-301 (1) (c) r e f e r s to the del ivery of co l la tera l of 
chattel paper . § 70A-9-105, Utah Code Annotated (1953) s t a t es : 
(b) "Chat te l paper" means a writ ing or wr i t ings which 
evidence both a mone ta ry obligation and a secur i ty 
i n t e re s t in or a lease of specific goods. When a t r a n s -
act ion is evidenced both by such a secur i ty ag reemen t 
or l ease and by an i n s t r u m e n t or s e r i e s of ins t ruments 
the group of wr i t ings taken together const i tutes chattel 
pa pe r . 
The defendant Peterson !s wr i t ing , i . e . , l ea se , evidences both a mone ta ry 
obligation and a l ease of specific goods, i . e . , use permi t and lease of 
f ixtures a t tached t h e r e t o . 
There fo re , the re does not appear to be any r eason why the 
plaintiff should be allowed to a s s e r t his secur i ty in te res t agains t the 
defendant P e t e r s o n . 
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POINT V I . 
THE SALES CONTRACT WAS IMPROPERLY 
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE BY THE TRIAL 
COURT AND WAS, THEREFORE, REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
The plaintiff instituted a law suit to r e p o s s e s s cer ta in 
pe rsona l p roper ty and a use permi t purportedly sold on a con-
ditional sa les ag reemen t at tached to pla int i f fs complaint . 
Because of the alleged default of defendant Joes Valley it was 
vital to the plaintiff rs case to have said contract introduced 
into evidence^ that it was a valid contract and that the commerc ia l 
code pertaining to the filing of a secur i ty in te res t had been a c -
complished. The plaintiff made seve ra l a t tempts to introduce 
the contrac t over objection of the appellant . When it became 
obvious that the plaintiff could not introduce the contract as a 
contract , the Court admit ted the contract as i l lus t ra t ive of 
plaintiff 's tes t imony without any quest ions concerning its legali ty 
and that it did not es tab l i sh the validity of the ag reemen t (R. 156). 
The t r i a l judge in his findings then used the contract as 
a bas i s of then finding that there was a conditional sa les ag reemen t 
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and that the plaintiff was entit led to r e c o v e r . The contract 
was not admiss ib l e under any c i r cums tances and was not 
i l lus t ra t ive of plaintiff 's tes t imony and should have not been 
admit ted for any purpose . 
Without a contrac t being proper ly admit ted into evidence 
as a cont rac t , the plaintiff has completely failed to es tab l i sh 
his case and the Court should have as a m a t t e r of law d i smis sed 
plaintiff 's complaint on file. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
In conclusion, a thorough reading of the t r a n s c r i p t shows 
that the purported sa les a g r e e m e n t which is the subject ma t t e r 
of this lawsuit is not a valid contract because it was not approved 
by the board of d i r e c t o r s . That the plaintiff did not have anything 
to sel l because the corpora t ion a l r eady owned the i tems l isted 
on the purported cont rac t and that the contract which is the bas i s 
of this act ion to begin with was never proper ly admit ted into 
evidence as a cont rac t and that the Court should have d i smis sed 
plaintiff 's complaint and found as a m a t t e r of law no cause of 
ac t ion. 
Respectfully submit ted, 
Eve re t t E. Dahl 
760 Eas t Center S t ree t 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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